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We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich 
domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller 
and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences. 
From  the point of  view of  Nash implementation theory, the result  yields a  par- 
tial characterization of  the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability.  Alterna- 
tively, the result can  be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy- 
implementability of  monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are 
completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that 
stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  a famous paper, Maskin  (1977)  has shown a condition called  "monotonicity" 
to be necessary and not far from sufficient for the implementation of  a social choice 
correspondence (SCC) in  Nash equilibrium1  For single-valued SCCs on sufficiently 
rich  domains, this is  a  highly  negative result, since  it was also shown  by  Muller- 
Satterthwaite (1977) as well as Dasgupta-Hammond-Maskin (1979) that under these 
assumptions, monotonicity implies strategy-proofness, which in turn is well known to 
be highly restrictive.  The main result of  this paper, Theorem 1, shows that Muller 
and Satterthwaite's result  can be generalized to correspondences:  monotonicity on 
"comprehensive"  domains implies "generalized strategy-proofness"  (GSP)  . 
Thus generalized to correspondences, the result looses its highly negative implica- 
tions for Nash implementation, since the class of  monotone SCCs is large; it includes, 
for example, the Pareto correspondence and, more generally, the class of  core cor- 
respondences with  respect  to some effectivity function2, as well as the constrained 
Walrasian correspondence  on economic domains.  Moreover,  the class of  monotone 
SCCs is closed under (pointwise) intersection and union; thus any SCC has a unique 
minimal monotone extension  (Sen (1995); see also Thomson  (1992)).  Theorem 1 
yields information about the restrictiveness of  the conditions of monotonicity respec- 
tively  Nash implementability.  In  particular, by showing a qualitative continuity of 
the properties of  monotone SCCs with the single-valued case, it suggests that on com- 
prehensive domains, monotone SCCs will be multi-valued to a significant extent (that 
goes beyond mere tie-breaking, for instance); this is  borne out by a more detailed 
'  "Monotonicity" is also sometimes referred to  as "strong" or  "Maskin" monotonicity or as  "Strong 
Positive Association".  Maskin's result  (see also Maskin  (1985)) has been refined by for  example 
Moore-Repullo ( 1 990), Sjostrom ( lggl),  and Danilov (1992). 
21n the sense of  Moulin-Peleg(l982). analysis (see section 4). 
On an alternative reading of  the result, Theorem 1 can be viewed as a  possibility 
theorem which says that there exists a rich and interesting class of  non-empty-valued 
SCCs  defined on  comprehensive domains  that can  be implemented  in  dorninant- 
strategy equilibrium  as correspondences, i.e.  via "indeterminate" mechanisms with 
sets of  alternatives as outcomes (LLquasi-mechanisms"):  the class of  monotone SCCs. 
Since this class contains the class of  core correspondences with respect to some ef- 
fectivity function, monotone SCCs allow to model property-rights based social choice 
quite generally; similarly, no-envy- and libertarian decisiveness-conditions give rise to 
monotone SCCs. 
The dominant-strategy interpretation is substantiated in section 3, in which agents' 
behavior  in  quasi-mechanisms is  formalized.  "Generalized Strategy-Proofness"  is 
shown  to characterize dominant-strategy  implementable SCCs in  which agents are 
"completely ignorant" about the final selection from the outcome set; it can thus be 
viewed as the weakest meaningful strategy-proofness condition for correspondences. 
Generalized Strategy-Proofness may seem very weak; however, stronger strategy- 
proofness properties are simply not in  the cards in most cases, even for very well- 
behaved SCCs such as core correspondences; see examples 2 and 3 below, as well as 
Barbera (1977) and Kelly (1977) who obtained impossibility results for the somewhat 
stronger property of  "weak strategy-proofness".  As a result, Generalized  Strategy- 
Proofness  is  arguably  the  most  infornative strategy-proohess property  for corre- 
spondences.  We note that for core correspondences derived from convex3 effectivity 
functions, Demange (1981) has shown their coalitional strategy-proofness.  Theorem 1 
31n the sense of Peleg (1982). can be viewed as a generalization of  the non-cooperative aspect of  her contribution.* 
The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proves and discusses 
the main result. The strategic interpretation of  the employed strategy-proofness con- 
dition GSP is given in section 3; it is argued that GSP has considerable appeal in an 
incomplete information context (dominant-strategy implementation), but will often 
be unsatisfactory under complete information (direct Nash implementation). Section 
4 applies the main result to core correspondences  based on effectivity-functions; in 
particular, their strategy-proofness and non-empty-valuedness on  a  comprehensive 
domain are shown to be intimately related. Section 5 concludes. 
2. THE MAIN RESULT 
Let X denote a finite set of social alternatives, L the set of linear orders
5 on X with 
generic element  Y,  '27  = n,,,  Vi  2 L'  a domain of  preference profiles P = (Pi)i,I.6 
A social  choice  correspondence (SCC)  C  maps  preference profiles to sets of  social 
alternatives, C : 2)  +ZX  .7 P is an x-improvement over Q ("P  t>,  Q" ) if  yPx  implies 
yQx for all y E X. 
Definition 1 C  is monotone if,  for any i,P,Q,x  such  that Q p,  Pi, x  E  C(P) 
implies x E C(Q7  P-i). 
4Modulo  a difference between generalized and "optimistic" strategy-proofness described in section 
4. 
5A linear  order is an asymmetric,  transitive and weakly  connected  (x #  y  xPy  or  yPx) 
relation.  / 
'~hrou~hout,  preference profiles are distinguished notationally from preference relations through 
their bold face. 
'The  analysis can straightforwardly  be generalized to allow for fixed indifference sub-relations 
for each agent (cf. remark 6 following Theorem 1 below). To define an  appropriate generalization of  the notion of  strategy-proofness, it is 
helpful to associate with an ordering P on X an extension to an order on the subsets 
of  X  (i.e., on  2*), denoted by p. 
Definition 2  (P)  For S,T  E  2X: S  T  if  T  # 0, and,  for all z E  S  and all 
YET:  XP  y. 
Definition 3 (GSP)  C is  (generalized) strategy-proof if for no i,  P,  Q : 
C(Q,P-i) a  C(P). 
Interpreted in strategic terms, generalized strategy-proofness asserts that rnisrep- 
resent at  ion of  preferences is never unambiguously advantageous; alternatively put, for 
any P E  V and any i  E I,  there exists a selection  g  of  C(.,  PPi)  such  that under g 
it is not in agent i's interests to misrepresent his preferences at the preference profile 
P; see section  3 for further discussion. 
Definition 4 D  is comprehensive 2f  for all i E I  and all P, Q E Vi, R E C  : R 2 
P  Q implies R E Vi. 
To paraphrase:  V  is comprehensive if for any i E  I and any P, Q E Vi, Vi contains 
all R between P and Q. In particular, any domain V  such that each Vi consists of  all 
linear orders extending a fixed strict partial order Qi  is comprehensive. 
Theorem 1 A  monotone non-empty-valued SCC C with comprehensive  domain is 
/ 
strategy-proof. 
Since  both monotonicity and strategy-proofness  are conjunctions of  single-agent 
conditions, it is notationally simpler and conceptually cleaner to prove the result and 
conduct some of the following discussion in terms of single-person choice-correspondences f  : D +  2"; this is evidently without loss of  generality siuce one can apply the result 
to f = C(.,  P-,) . 
Proof.  For k  _<  n = #X and P E L, let P(k) denote the k-th ranked alternative 
x  (from  the top).  Also, for  P, Q  E  C  and 1 5  n, with  m  defined implicitly  by 
P(m)  = Q(1) given P, Q and 1, let a1(Q,  P) be defined by 
Ql(Q,  P)  results from P by moving the m-th alternative into l-th position, thus 
ensuring that the now l-  th ranked alternative coincides with the alternative that is 
l-th ranked with respect  to Q, Q(1).  To prove the theorem, fix any P,Q  E D.  It 
needs to be shown that there exist 2'  E f (Q) and y* E f (P)  such that not y*Qz'. 
Define inductively the finite sequence {Ql)l=o,...,n  in D  such that Qo = P, Q,  = Q 
and Q1  = al(Q,  QlP1).  It is straightforward from the construction that 
for k 5 I : QL(k)  = Q(k)  (1) 
and 
for k # 1 :  QL-I  D_Q,(~) QL .  (2) 
From (I),  it follows that Ql > Q n  Q1-,, for all 1 5 n,  hence that Q1 E V  for all 
1 5 n by comprehensivenesd. 
Let k* = max{k  I Q(k) E f (P)),  set y* equal to Q(k*),  the Q-worst alternative in 
f (P),  and fix any X*  E f (Qk.) . We will show  that not y*Qx*  as well as x* E f(Q), 
as desired. From (2) and the monotonicity of f  (modus tollens), it follows that 
From this one obtains by induction 
Since by (1) and the definition of  y* one has in particular 
it follows from (3) and the definition of  k* that 
for no z  E f (Qk=)  : y*Qz.  (4) 
In particular, 
not y*Qx*. 
Moreover, it follows from  (4), the definition of  k*, (1) and the monotonicity of  f 
that 
f  (Q) 2 f (Qk4 
which implies by the definition of  x* 
(5) and (6) demonstrate the claim. 
/ 
Discussion: 
We  begin the discussion  by an overall assessment of  the result, to be followed by 
remarks on technical aspects of  the theorem and on the possibility of generalizations. 1.  Viewed as a possibility result, Theorem 1 ensures the existence of a large and 
natural class of  strategy-proof  correspondences.  From  this perspective, its impor- 
tance hinges on the intrinsic appeal of  the strategy-proofness condition, as well as on 
the degree to which the existence of  attractive strategy-proof correspondences is not 
evident without the result.  The former aspect is discussed in section 3.  As to the 
latter, the existence of  some minimally attractive strategy-proof is very easily estab- 
lished; for example, the correspondence of  all Pareto efficient alternatives ("Pareto 
correspondence")  is GSP
8. Moreover, any super-correspondence of  a strategy-proof 
SCC is strategy-proof as well.  Thus, for example, any SCC that contains at each 
profile the top alternative of each agent is strategy-proof and anonymous; such SCCs 
will be referred to as "indeterminately dictatorial". 
So there are lots of  strategy-proof  SCCs; however, it is not so obvious that there 
exist strategy-proof SCCs that are sufficiently selective, "small" in a relevant sense. 
Note  first  that  "smallness"  is  not  adequately  measured  by  the cardinality of  the 
selected sets.  The smallest indeterminately dictatorial SCC, for example, selects at 
any profile at most as many alternatives as there are agents; however, measured in 
terms of  the range of  agents'  utilities generated by the chosen alternatives at each 
profile, this correspondence is  very large.  Indeed, in  many cases it is hardly more 
selective than the Pareto correspondence or even than the constant correspondence 
selecting the all feasible
g 
alternatives. In particular, indeterminately dictatorial SCCs 
will generally fail to ensure satisfaction of  lower bounds on agent's utility (i.e. violate 
non-trivial individual rationality constraints). 
Theorem 1 ensures the ekistence of  a wide range of  selective strategy-proof SCCs. 
Take any monotone SCC G as an "upper bound" on "admissible" C C  G; for example, 
'~ndeed,  it satisfies much stronger strategy-proofness properties than GSP. 
'Which  may be a strict subset of the domain X. G can incorporate efficiency and individual rationality conditions on C.  In view of 
Theorem 1, for every monotone G, there exist admissible strategy-proof SCCs: simply 
put C = G. 
One may want to go further and ask how closely it is possible to  approximate single- 
valuedness; specifically, one may want to hd,  for some given single-valued H 2 GI 
its minimal strategy-proof extension.  Strategy-proofness  being not an intersection- 
closed property, there typically will be more than one such correspondence.  Theorem 
1 yields useful information about these: since the pointwise intersection of  monotone 
correspondences is monotone, any correspondence B has a unique minimal monotone 
extension B*  . Thus, for any minimal strategy-proof extension C of HI  H*  is an upper 
bound for C by Theorem 1: C C  H* C  G . In particular, H can be approximated well 
by a strategy-proof SCC whenever it can be approximated well by a monotone SCC 
(for a study of  minimal monotone extensions, see Sen (1995) and Thomson (1992)). 
2.  One might  have expected to obtain a characterization of  monotone SCCs in 
terms of  a  strategy-proofness property  (as in  Muller-Satterthwaite's  (1977)  theo- 
rem for the single-valued case), rather than a uni-directional implication.  However, 
monotonicity implies the following IIA-type condition: 
Condition 1  For any i,  P,  Q,  x  such that Q D,  P,  and Pi  k,  Q:  x E C(P) w x E 
C(Q,  P-i). 
This condition seems to be devoid of  any strategy-proofness content. 
/ 
3.  GSP may  be substantially weaker  than monotonicity,  as illustrated  by  the 
following example. 
Example 1  Let X = {a,  b,  c), I = {1,2,3),  and 2)  = L'. Define  an SCC C* by setting C*(P)  equal  to the unipe Condorcet  winner if it 
exists, and equal to X  otherwise.  It is easily seen that C*  is GSP but not monotone. 
Indeed,  no  Condorcet  consistent non-empty-valued  SCC is monotone.  This can be 
seen as follows. 
The following matrix labels the set of  six preference orderings in L (listing alterna- 
tives from top to bottom here and  throughout): 




By Condorcet  consistency,  C(Q1,  P2,  P3) = {b). Hence by monotonicity  (modus 
tollens), c  $  C(Pll  P2,  P3). By analogous  arguments,  C(Pl,  Q2,  P3) = {c), hence 
a  4  C(Pl,  P2,  P3), as well  as C(PII  P2,  Q3)  = {a),  hence b 4  C(Pl,  P2,  P3). These 
implications jointly contradict the assumed  non-empty-valuedness of C. 
4.  For single-valued choice-functions, the domain assumption can be significantly 
weakened, in particular to connected domains defined as follows. 
Definition 5 V is connected  if  for all i E  I  and  all P,Q E Vi  the following holds: 
zf there exists R E C  such that R 2 P n  Q  and R 4  {P,  Q),  then there exists R E  Vi 
such that R > P fl  Q  and R $ {P,  Q)." 
For example, the class of  .preferences that are single-peaked with respect to some 
linear order Q*  on X  is connected but not comprehensive.  Such weakening is not 
possible in the set-valued case, as the following example shows. 
''Connectedness  can be  paraphrased thus: for any i and any non-neighboring PI  Q E Di,  D,  must 
contain a preference relation R strictly between P and Q. Example 2  X = {a,b,c,d),  23 = {PIP1,  P"), 
with P, P', P"  given by the following matrix: 
P  P'  P" 
aa  b 
bb  a 
cdd 
dc  c 
Define  f  by f(P)  = {a),  f(P1)  = {a,d) and f(P")  = {d). f  is monotone, but 
violates GSP. 'D  is connected;  the smallest  comprehensive  domain containing V  is 
V  U {Q),  with b Q  a Q  c Q  d.  It is easily  verified  that f  cannot be  extended  to a 
monotone and non-empty-valued correspondence f'  on V  1J  {Q). 
5.  GSP cannot be strengthened in  Theorem 1 to Kelly's  (1977) "weak strategy- 
proofness"  (WSP) which  is obtained by extending the induced partial set-order 
to p, reflecting an attribution of  strictly positive weight  (lower probability) to any 
alternative in the outcome set. 
Definition 6  i)  For SIT  E 2':  S  T  if  for some x E S  and y G TI  x  P y,  and 
for no x'  E S  and y'  E T, y'  P x' . 
ii) (WSP)  C is weakly strategy-proof if for no i,  P,  Q : C(Q,  P-~)E  C(P). 
We will see below in section 4 that violations are quite common; for instance, the 
restriction of  f in example 2 to the comprehensive domain {P,  P') fails to be WSP. 
While desirable, WSP is simply not in  the cards in many cases. 
6.  A straightforward but important generalization of  Theorem 1 is to situations 
in which agents care only about (possibly different) aspects of the social state, as for 
instance in discrete private-goods economies or matching problems. Technically, the assumption that all preference relations are linear orderings on X 
can be weakened to the assumption that agent its preference relations are linear on 
Xi  (with X = Xi  x X-i), i.e.  that they are asymmetric, transitive and satisfy the 
condition: 
(xPyoryPx)  xify,  forallx,y~X. 
7.  Dasgupta-Hammond-Maskin  (1979) have shown for single-valued SCCs the va- 
lidity of  an analogue to Theorem 1 for economic domains in which  preferences are 
assumed to be convex and continuous. Such an analogue does not exist for choice cor- 
respondences; for example, the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence is monotone 
but not generalized strategy-proof since it is not even strategy-proof at single-valued 
points."  This shows that the conclusion of  the result  for correspondences is sub- 
stantially  stronger,  and thus  confirms  the need  for  substantially stronger  domain 
assumptions for its validi ty.I2 
3.  ON THE STRATEGIC INTERPRETATION OF GENERALIZED 
STRATEGY-PROOFNESS 
The intrinsic strategic meaning of  CSP is best elucidated in the context of  mech- 
anisms F : niEl  Si +  2X\0  that map strategy profiles s = (s~)~~~  to non-empty sets 
"Note that the Walras correspondence itself is  monotone if  X is  taken to be the set of all (not 
necessarily  feasible) allocations. 
/  I21n view of the connectedness but non-comprehensiveness of the class of single-peaked preferences 
(cf.  #4  above) and the fact  that single-peakedness  with  respect to a a given  linear order can 
be viewed as a convexity  restriction, we  conjecture that the culprit is the convexity  assumption 
on preferences  necessary  to ensure the existence of  Walrasian equilibria,  rather than the infinite 
cardinality of the domain or the continuity of  preferences. of alternatives ("quasi-mechanisms") , the set-valuedness reflecting an indeterminacy 
of  the final outcome.  The agents' (possibly partial) orderings over sets lli are deter- 
mined by their rankings of  the alternatives and their beliefs about the final selection 
(as well as possibly their attitudes toward ignorance). 
One interesting level of  analysis derives from assuming that the agents rely only 
on the information about the final outcome given by the mechanism, in other words: 
that they act  as-if  they  were  completely ignorant  about the final selection.  Such 
A 
ignorance is captured by  endowing the agents with the partial orderings IIi = Pi 
defined  in  section  2; agents with such  preferences will  be called  "agnostic".  The 
notions of  Nash  and dominant-strategy equilibrium are defined naturally; one just 
needs to accommodate the possible incompleteness of  the set rankings. 
Definition 7  i) s is a best response to sPi  in  the (quasi-)game (F,  II) if there does 
not exist s'  E Si such that F(sl,  S_~)II,F(S,  s-~). 
ii) s is a Nash equilibrium in (F,  II) if, for all i E I,  si is a best response to s-i. 
iii) s is a dominant-strategy equilibrium (DSE) in (F,  II) if, for all i E I  and 
all s'_,  E njZjfi  Sj,  S, is a best response to sLi. 
A  prominent  class of  mechanisms are the direct  or  revelation  mechanisms  with 
S, = Di and F = C; "truth-telling" in a revelation  mechanism is described by the 
strategy-profile P. Standard arguments yield the following result for agnostic agents. 
Proposition 1  The following  four statements are equivalent: 
i) C satisfies GSP.  , 
ii) P is a Nash equilibrium in (C,  P)  for all PE  V. 
iii) P is a DSE in (C,  P)  for all PE  2). 
iv) C can be implemented in  DSE13 via some quasi-mechanism F  when agents are 
131n the obvious sense. agnostic. 
Remark 1:  If  one replaces GSP with WSP and @ by P, one obviously obtains an 
analogous result. 
Remark 2:  GSP is consistent with subjective expected-utility maximization if no 
restrictions at all on  the subjective probabilities of  the final outcome selected from 
c(@)  are imposed14. If  however one requires dl agents to have identical probability 
distributions over the selection, one obtains effectively a single-valued mechanism with 
lotteries as outcomes; in a social choice-setting, such mechanisms do not significantly 
enlarge the class of  strategy-proof SCCs (see Gibbard (1977)). 
In  view of  proposition 1, Theorem 1 can  be viewed as a general possibility theo- 
rem establishing the existence of a large class of  SCCs that are DSE implementable 
for agnostic agents.  The plausibility  (at least  as an approximation) and relevance 
in application of  the assumption of  agnosticism critically depends on the context, in 
particular on whether agents' information about each others preferences is complete 
or incomplete.  On the one hand, in a Nash context in  which agents' preferences are 
commonly known, the outcome set  C(P) resulting from  truth-telling is  also com- 
monly known; it is then natural for agent to consult his beliefs about, and even form 
more definite beliefs about, the final selection from C(P)  and from the sets C(P,  P_.i) 
resulting from hypothetical deviations; this may well lead to perceived opportunities 
of advantageous manipulation. In particular, failures of  weak strategy-proofness are 
detrimental to any claim that truth-telling constitutes a satisfactory Nash  equilib- 
/ 
riurn. 
On the other hand, in  an incomplete information context in which  agents'  pref- 
erences are mutually uncertain  (as is generally presupposed in the search for DSE- 
I4Across agents as  well as any agents' types. implementable choice-functions), these considerations  have much  less force, since a 
deviation  that is advantageous at some  preference  profile of  the other agents may 
well be disadvantageous at others; this indeed seems highly probable if the mecha- 
nism is known to satisfy GSP. GSP may thus be viewed as a criterion of  prima-facie 
incentive-compatibility.  In  addition, to ascertain  that a  contemplated deviation is 
advantageous overall requires much greater computational effort due to the need of 
checking for  countervailing  trade-offs, and may  thus not even  be  attempted  by  a 
boundedly rational  agent in  view of  the prima-facie  optimality of  an "agnostically 
dominant" strategy. 
4.  APPLICATION TO CORE  CORRESPONDENCES 
An  eflectilrity function 9 maps non-empty subsets of  agents ("coalitions") to sets 
of  subsets of  alternatives, 9  : 2'\0  -+  2(2X\*); 9(S)  describes those restrictions on the 
social outcome of the form "C(P) 2 Y", for Y E  2X\8,  that coalition S is entitled to 
enforce.  Given a preference profile P, the core of  9 C,p(P)  is given as the (possibly 
empty) set of  alternatives that no coalition can block. 
Definition 8 (Core) C,p(P) = {x E  X  /For  no S C  I and Y E 9(S)  : 'v'i  E S,  y  E 
Y : yP*x). 
In  a social choice context  with universal domain L', anonymous and neutral ef- 
fectivity functions can be parametrically described  by a function y : (1, ..,#I)  --+ 
(1, ..,  #X) according to 
/ 
Moulin (1981) has shown the following result15. 
''See  Moulin-Peleg (1982) for a generalization of the  analysis to  non-anononymous and non-neutral 
effectivity functions. Proposition 2 (Moulin) C*,  is non-empty-valued  on C1 if and only if, for all h 5 
#I : y(14 > #X . (1 - a). 
Corollary 1 There exists a minimal anonymous and neutral non-empty-valued core 
correspondence C*?  on C1 (the ')roportional veto correspondence"),  with y* given 
by 
h 
y*(h)  = smallest integer strictly exceeding #X - (1 -  ---). 
#I 
From this and Theorem 1 one obtains immediately: 
Proposition 3  For any y  2 y*, C*,  is strategy-proof. 
In "heuristic continuity" with the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type impossibility results 
for  single-valued  SCCs, one surmises  that  C*,  should  be  multi-valued  to a  non- 
negligible extent. This is  borne out by inspection. 
For instance, consider the proportional veto correspondence in situations in which 
#X  = 3 and #I  2 2. Let pp  denote the distribution of  preference orderings associated 
#  i€  I  P,=Q)  with the profile P given by pp  (Q) =  {  . It is easily verified that #Cq7. (P)  > 
1 if and only if  i) for all x  E X, pp({Q  I  Q(1) = x)) 5 2,  and ii) for at most one 
x E X, pp({Q I Q(3) = x)) > 5 . If  pp is viewed as element of  the C-unit simplex 
A", the set uf  distributions p in  A" satisfying i) and ii) has non-empty interior and 
does not shrink as the number of  agents increases. Sen (1995) shows this phenomenon 
to be entirely general for  the class of  monotone SCCs that are non-dictatorial and 
have a range of  at least three alternatives.I6 
/ 
'%en himself expresses the point in terms of an asymptotic statement saying that monotone SCCs 
are multi-valued for a non-negligible fraction of preference profiles even in the limit as the number 
of agents becomes infinitely large. In  a  related  vein, Barbera (1977) has shown  that weakly strategy-proof17 choice- 
correspondences that respect conditions of  unanimity and "positive responsiveness" 
(which formalizes the notion that multiplicity may arise exclusively to accommodate 
ties) must be dictatorial; this result seems however of limited significance to the study 
of  monotone SCCs since the gap between generalized and weak strategy-proofness is 
significant (cf. example 3 below). 
One may wonder whether the additional structure of  core-correspondences can be 
exploited to strengthen Theorem 1.  The following example proves this expectation 
to be wrong:  in general, neither can the domain assumptions be weakened nor the 
strategy-proofness implications be strengthened. 
Example 3 Let X = {a, b, c,  d)  and I = {1,2,3,4). 
1  2fh>3 
Consider the "75%-majority rule" G = Cq7..  , with ?**(h)  = 
4  ifh12 
Tile o~de7:s  E;,  of  agent k,  for k > 1 , are given by the following table: 
p2  p3  p4 
abc 
b  c  d. 
cda 
dab 
Consider the following orderings for agent  1: 
"Barbera's  condition of "uniform non-manipulability" effectively amounts to  Kelly's WSP defined 
/ 
above with P restricted to sets S, T such that, #S + #T 5 3. daa  d 
add  a 
cc  b  b 
bbc  c 
G  fails to be  strategy-proof  at  single-valued  points and  thus wiolates  GSP since 
G(f'", Pi. P3,P4) = {a}p{c)  = G(P,  P2, P3,  P4). By Theorem 1, G  cannot be  non- 
empty-valued  071  {P,  PI, PI1,  P"') x  {P2} x {P3} x  {P4),  the smallest comprehensive 
domain containing the two preference profiles involved in the violation.  Indeed,  one 
easily verifies G(PU',  P2,  P3,  P4)  = 0. 
Thus, as a result  about  core-correspondences (for which monotonicity is trivial), 
Theorem 1  can be  read  as deriving GSP from the non-empty-valuedness of  the corre- 
spondence on a compr.ehensive set. 
Note also  that G  violates  WSP18 on {P,  PI) x {P2)  x  {P3)  x  {P4). It is easy to 
give  exantples  of such violatiorls  for core  correspondences Cq7 that are  non-empty- 
valued  on all  oj  C1. For i7~stance,  modify example 3 by setting Xf = X  U {e), and 
I 
1  ifh=4 
G+ = C  ,  with y+(h) =  2  if h h= 3  , and  define  P+,  P+', Pk+  from P,  P', Pk 
*7+ 
5  ifh<2 
above by inserting e as second-ranked  element into each preference ordering. 
The continued necessity of  strong domain assumptions suggests that a direct veri- 
'  fication of  the strategy-proofness of  a core-correspondence will be non-trivial. This is 
confirmed by  the work of Demange (1987) that is directly devoted to this question. 
She has shown that in fact somewhat stronger strategy-proofness properties can be 
obtained when  the effectivity-functions are convex in the sense of  Peleg (1982);  for 
"As  well as OSP just below. 
17 example, the effectivity-function defining the proportional veto correspondence is con- 
vex, while weaker effectivity-functions typically are not. Specifically, Demange proved 
that under convexity,  core correspondences  are "coalitionally  non-manipulable".1g 
This strenghtens GSP by considering coalitional  deviations, and by  assuming that 
agents evaluate  SCCs optimistically  in  terms of  an ordering P  containing  and 
defined follows. 
Definition 9  i) For S,T  E  2X: S -fi T if T # 0,  and there exists x E S  such that 
for ally E T:  x P y. 
ii)  (OSP)  C is  optimistically strategy-proof if  for no i,  P,  Q : C(Q,  P-i)E  C(P). 
To the extent  to which  the differences between optimistic and general  strategy- 
proofness can be negle~ted,~'  Theorem 1 can be viewed as generalization of  the non- 
cooperative dimension of  Demange's result. 
At least at first glance, the mathematics underlying the two results is very different. 
While hers relies on the "holistic" property of  convexity, ours seems essentially "indi- 
vidualistic" in that both the monotonicity and the comprehensive-domain condition 
are agent-by-agent  assumptions.  However, a closer connection can be established if 
one views the (holistic) non-empty-valuedness assumption of  Theorem 1 as a sub- 
stantive consistency assumption on the social choice correspondence.  In the context 
of  a universal domain, this connection is indeed remarkably precise in view of Peleg's 
(1982) result who showed that a core correspondence C,p  is non-empty-valued on C' 
if and only if it contains the core correspondence C*, associated with some convex 
effectivity function Q".  / 
'gDe~nange  also suggested a complete-ignorance interpretation of  the set-valuedness of  the corre- 
spondences, and noted the weakness of  the strategy-proofness properties of core-correspondences in 
general. She did not consider the weaker property GSP. 
201t is easily verified that OSP does not imply WSP, which seems to  be the more interesting notion 
from the present non-cooperative  point of  view. 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Theorem 1 is situated at the "edge of  possibility":  weaken GSP, and the strategy- 
proofness interpretation is lost; strengthen GSP, and few SCCs will satisfy the strength- 
ened condition on comprehensive domains. The result helps explaining the celebrated 
impossibility  theorem of  Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) when viewed as 
a  result about  single-valued GSP correspondences:  the impossibility is caused  not 
so much  by  strategy-proofness per se, as  by  the additional  requirement  of  single- 
valuedness.  We note that while single-valuedness is  attractive from a  mechanism- 
design perspective, it seems too strong to make this requirement absolute: in partic- 
ular, it seems misguided to rule out as fundamental a mechanism as the Walrasian 
merely on the ground of  its set-valuedne~s.~' 
In  response to Gibbard-Satterthwaite's impossibility  theorem, a  spate of  recent 
work  has concentrated on  obtaining more  positive  results  by  imposing  (typically 
strong) restrictions on the domain of  preferences.  It would be an interesting ques- 
tion for future research to try to analogously improve on Theorem 1 by such domain 
restrictions. In principle, improvements of two kinds might be obtained: the strategy- 
proofness properties of  the SCC may be strengthened, and/or SCCs may emerge that 
are especially "small" in a relevant sense.  In view of  the ease of  obtaining violations 
of  even weak strategy-proofness, the prospects for the former seem to be slim.  As a 
likely example of  the latter, consider  &-cores  of  finite private goods economies with 
non-convex preferences in  the sense of  Wooders (1983).  For given I,  these are non- 
empty for sufficiently  large,&, but not very selective at many preference profiles.  In 
view of  the absence of substantive domain-restrictions on preferences, it seems highly 
21~or  a spirited recent  argument for  the game-theoretic interest in  set-valued  mechanisms, see 
Brandenburger-St uart (1  996). likely  that non-empty-valued  &-core correspondences arq strategy-proof.22  Ranade 
(1995) has shown that for any given e > 0, non-emptiness of  the &-core  is assured for 
sufficiently large I. Thus, as the number of  economic agents becomes large, "small" 
(approximately Walrasian) strategy-proof correspondences emerge. 
"Cf.  remarks G and 7 of  section 2. 
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